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THE PMCTICAL 
EJ;AL ESTATE 
-LAWYEBC­
JANUARY 1987 
An Overview of 
Fair Housing Litigation 
(Part 1) 
Edward G. Kramer 
Kenneth J. Kowalski 
Almost any lawyer with real estate clients 
can find himself in the middle of a fair 
housing suit. 
THE PURPOSE OF TIIlS ARTICLE is limit its review to three principle fed­to give an overview of federal fair eral statutes affecting equal-housing 
housing laws and their impact on the opportunities: Title VIII of the Civil 
real estate industry. This article will Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §3(,()1 
The authors wish to acknowledge the assistance of Tia Williams, James Diggins, 
and Barbara Zamlen in preparation of this article. 
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et seq. (hereinafter cited as the "Act" 
or "Title VIII") and the 1866 and 1870 
Civil Rights Acts, 42 U.S.C. §§1981, 
1982 (respectively "section 1981" and 
"section 1982"). A review of the sub­
stantive provisions of the statutes, 
methods of enforcement, and judicial 
interpretations are included. The ar­
ticle also discusses specific evidentiary 
issues, defenses, remedies, and 
awards of attorneys' fees. 
H ISTORICAL IMPACT • Tu under­stand the broad coverage and 
liberal judicial interpretation of these 
laws, one must examine the causes 
and impact of housing segregation in 
the United States. The causes include 
general societal bias, government pol­
icies, and, not incidentally, real estate 
industry practices. For example, until 
1950 the National Association of Real 
Estate Boards' Code of Ethics prohib­
ited realtors from making sales to 
blacks in white areas. See Zuch v. 
Hussey, 394E Supp. 1028, 1055 (E.D. 
Mich 1975), modified on other grounds, 
547 E2d 1168 (6th Cir. 1977). For a 
review of the role government played 
in this area, see Kramer, Promises, 
Promises: A New Day for Open 
Housing, 21 N.Y. L.E 537 (Spring 
1976). Appraiser manuals as recently 
as 1975 continued to rank race and 
nationality as factors affecting land 
values. See McMichaels, Appraisal 
Manual (Prentice-Hall, New York 
City, 1975); United States v. Am. Inst. 
ofReal Estate Appraisers, Etc., 442 E 
Supp. 1072, 1079 (N.D. Ill. 1977). 
It is not suprising that our racially 
segregated housing market often has 
been cited as limiting opportunities for 
minorities to obtain a decent education 
and job. Our metropolitan areas have 
been described as "the racial shape of a 
donut with the Negroes in the hole and 
with mostly whites occupying the 
ring." United States v. City of Black 
Jack Missouri, 508 E2d 1179, 1186 
(8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 
1042 (1975). See Keyes v. School Dis­
trict, 413 U.S. 189, 201-202 (1973); 
Banksv. Perk, 341ESupp.1175, 1178 
(N.D. Ohio 1972), aff'din part, rev'd in 
part, 473 E2d 910 (6th Cir. 1973). It 
was in this context ofan"America rap­
idly becoming two societies: one white 
the other black-separate and une­
qual" that Congress and the Courts 
grappled with fair housing in 1968. Re­
port ofthe National Advisory Commis­
sion on Civil Disorder 1 (Bantam 
Books, New York Qty, 1968). 
F AIR HOUSING LF.GISLATION • At this crucial period of our history, 
Congress passed the comprehensive 
Civil Rights Act of 1968. Title VIII of 
the law was enacted "to provide, 
within Constitutional limitations, for 
fair housing throughout the United 
States." 42 U.S.C. §3601. Later that 
same year, the United States Supreme 
Court rediscovered a seldom-used law 
passed immediately after the Civil 
War. The court declared that the law 
prohibited all housing discrimination, 
private as well as public, based on 
race. 
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The Ovil Rights Acts 
of 18<>6 and 1870 
Following the Civil War and the ab­
olition of slavery, Congress enacted 
the 1866 Civil Rights Act in an at­
tempt to extend to the newly freed 
slaves the rights of citizenship enjoyed 
by white persons. One of the provi­
sions of that act concerned the right 
of a citizen to own and control prop­
erty. That section, now codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 1982, provides that all citi­
zens shall have the same right as en­
joyed by white citizens to "inherit, 
purchase, lease, sell, hold and convey 
real and personal property." 
In 1870, Congress felt the necessity 
to pass another Civil Rights Act to ex­
tend further the rights of citizenship 
to nonwhite citizens. In the 1870 Act, 
Congress included a broader provi­
sion providing that "all persons . . . 
have the same right ... to make and 
enforce contracts . . . to the full and 
equal benefit of all laws and proceed­
ings for the security of persons and 
property as is enjoyed by white citi­
zens . . . . " These laws received rela­
tively little attention until the landmark 
Supreme Court decision in Jones v. 
Mayer, 392 U.S. 40'J (1968). 
In Jones, a black plaintiff had 
claimed a violation of section 1982 
due to a refusal of a private property 
owner to sell him a home solely on 
racial grounds. The Eighth Circuit 
had held that section 1982 applied 
only to state action. The Supreme 
Court reversed, holding that the stat­
ute prohibited both public and private 
discrimination in property sales or 
rentals. The Court held further that 
the statute was a constitutional exer­
cise of congressional power under the 
thirteenth amendment. 
Section 1982 
Of the two statutes, section 1982 is 
used most often by fair housing attor­
neys. Section 1981, the broader civil 
rights law, is generally relied on in 
housing litigation when there are no 
specific discriminatory practices in­
volved. Fair Housing-Fair Lending, 
~3152 (P-H) (1985). Section 1982, 
however, is used more often to attack 
specific discriminatory practices. For 
instanee, section 1982 has been held 
to prohibit: 
• A refusal to sell lots to black peo­
ple. McHaney v. Spears, 526 E Supp. 
566 (W.D. Tenn. 1981); 
• A homeowners' association's dis­
criminatory interference with the sale 
of a home to a black person. Phillips 
v. Hunter Trails Community Ass'n, 
685 E2d 184 (7th Cir. 1982); 
• Racial-based steering. Fair Ho~ng 
Council ofBergen County, Inc. v. E. 
Bergen County Multiple Listing Serv., 
Inc., 482 E Supp. 1071 (D. N.J. 
1976); 
• Selection procedures. Jordan v. 
Del/way Villa ofTennessee Ltd., 661 E 
2d 588 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 
455 U.S. 1008 (1982); and 
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• Racially motivated opposition to 
the construction of low-income hous­
ing. Bendetson v. Payson, 534 F. 
Supp. 539 (D. Mass. 1982). 
Often, section 1982 is used in con­
junction with the Act or section 1981. 
See, e.g., Marable v. H. Walker & As­
socs., 644 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1981); 
Gentry v. Northeast Management 
Co., Inc., 472 F. Supp. 1248 (N.D. 
Tex. 1979); Young v. Pi.erce, 544 F. 
Supp. 1010, 1019 (E.D. Tex. 1982). 
Section 1982 is not, however, coex­
tensive with the Act. First, it prohibits 
only discrimination based on race or 
color and does not apply to cases of 
discrimination based on religion, sex, 
or national origin. Second, unlike the 
Act, it contains no exemptions. There 
are other differences, which will be 
discussed below, concerning such is­
sues as: 
• Standing; 
• The statute of limitations; 
• Limits on punitive damages; and 
• A showing necessary for an award 
of attorneys' fees. 
Although section 1982 deals only 
with discrimination because of race or 
color, claims under the statute are not 
limited to black plaintiffs. Many 
courts have held that a white person 
who is the victim of racially discrimi­
natory acts may seek redress under 
section 1982. For instance, a section 
1982 claim can be made for the evic­
tion or attempted eviction of white 
tenants who entertain black guests, or 
the denial of housing to a white per­
son because of his spouse's or room­
mate's race. See Woods-Drake v. 
Lundy, fJ61 F.2d 1198 (5th Cir. 1982); 
Bills v. Hodges, 628 F.2d 844 (4th Cir. 
1980); Rupe v. Fourman, 532 F. Supp. 
344 (S.D. Ohio 1981); Bishop v. Pec­
sok, 431 F. Supp. 34 (N.D. Ohio 
1976); Oliver v. Shelly, 538 F. Supp. 
(JOO (S.D. Tex. 1982); Lamb v. Sallee, 
417 F. Supp. 282 (E.D. Ky. 1976). 
Yet, although a white person can 
raise a claim under section 1982, such 
a claim will not stand unless some ra­
cially motivated discrimination is al­
leged. Thus in Schneider v. Bahler, 564 
F. Supp. 1449 (N.D. Ind. 1983), a sec­
tion 1982 claim by white plaintiffs al­
leging nonracial discrimination was 
dismissed. 
Tide VIII 
The 1960s saw significant progress 
in the attainment of civil rights for mi­
norities. Particularly as a result of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Vot­
ing Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. 
§1971 et seq., progress was made in 
opening public accommodations to 
minorities, the dual school systems 
began to be desegregated, and more 
employment opportunities became 
available. Housing discrimination, 
however, was openly practiced in 
many communities. 
Finally, with the strong backing of 
President Lyndon Johnson, Congress 
addressed the problem of housing dis­
crimination with a federal fair housing 
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law, passed as Title VIII, which is now 
codified at 42 u.s.c. § 3(i()l et. seq. 
Purpose 
It has been observed that the Act 
was intended to promote "open, inte­
grated residential housing patterns 
and to prevent the increase ofsegrega­
tion, in ghettos, of racial groups 
whose lack of opportunities the Act 
was designed to combat." Otero v. 
New Turk City Hous. Auth., 484 E2d 
1122, 1134 (2d Cir. 1973). Recogniz­
ing the strong commitment to open 
housing voiced by Congress, other 
courts have held that the Act must be 
broadly interpreted. See Metropolitan 
Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of 
Arlington Heights, 558 E2d 1283, 
1289 (7th Cir. 1977) and cases cited 
therein. 
Prohibited Conduct 
Title VIII contains comprehensive 
prohibitions against discrimination. 
Section 3(i()4 of the Act prohibits dis­
crimination in the sale or rental of 
housing on the basis of race, color, reli­
gion, sex, or national origin, including: 
• Refusing to sell or rent after a bona 
fide offer has been made; 
• Discriminating on the terms, condi­
tions, or privileges of a sale or lease or 
in providing services or facilities; 
• Indicating any preference based on 
race or other like criteria in advertise­
ments for housing; 
• False representations as to the 
availability of a dwelling unit; and 
• Attempting to persuade owners to 
sell or rent dwellings by making repre­
sentations about the entry into the 
neighborhood of persons of a certain 
race. 
Exempted from the foregoing pro­
hibitions, except for that concerning 
advertising, are single-family homes 
sold or rented without the use of a 
broker and rooms or units in dwell­
ings for less than four families if the 
owner resides in one of the rooms or 
units. 42 U.S.C. §3(i()3(b). The latter 
exemption for the owner-occupied 
dwelling is known as the "Mrs. Mur­
phy" exception. See, e.g., U.S. v. 
Hunter, 459 E2d 205 (4th Cir.1972), 
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934 (1972). Also 
exempted is the sale or rental ofdwell­
ings by a religious organization to its 
members as long as membership in 
the religion is not discriminatory. 42 
u.s.c. §3(i()7. 
The Act prohibits discrimination in 
the finaneing of housing, including 
loans for purchasing, constructing, 
improving, repairing, or maintaining 
a home. 42 U.S.C. §3(!()5. Also pro­
hibited is discriminatory denial of ac­
cess to or membership in a multiple­
listing service or real estate broker 
organization. 42 U.S.C. §3(i()6. 
The Act makes it unlawful to co­
erce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere 
with a person exercising rights or aid­
ing or encouraging another in the ex­
ercise of rights granted or protected 
by the Act. 42 U.S.C. §3617. Attor­
neys with clients in the real estate busi­
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ness should also be aware of the possi­
bility of criminal charges that can be 
brought under Title IX of the 1968 
Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §3631, for 
intimidation by the use of force or 
threat of force against activities pro­
tected by Title VIII. 
Finally, the United States Supreme 
Court has recognized that a claim un­
der the Act can be tried by a jury. Cur­
tis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974). In 
drafting either the fair housing com­
plaint or answer, the lawyer must de­
cide whether to demand a trial by 
jury. 
Experience in this area indicates 
that the request for a jury is usually 
demanded by the defense. This reli­
ance may well be misplaced, however, 
considering the substantial verdicts in 
fair housing cases often rendered by 
all-white juries. Friedman, Damages 
in Housing Bias Litigation, 21 N.Y. L. 
E 551, 554-558 (1976). 
State Laws and Local Ordinances 
As of March 1986, 44 states had en­
acted fair-housing laws. In addition, 
hundreds of localities now have fair­
housing ordinances. State fair-hous­
ing laws vary considerably, but most 
are very comprehensive. Generally, 
discrimination in both the sale and 
rental of housing is prohibited, as is 
discrimination in the financing of 
residential properties. 
Many states have administrative 
agencies armed with the authority to 
receive and investigate complaints 
and to undertake conciliation efforts. 
Usually these agencies have been au­
thorized to issue cease and desist or­
ders after a hearing and to seek court 
enforcement of those orders. 
Local fair-housing ordinances vary 
considerably both in what is covered 
and how they are enforced. Some are 
very comprehensive, others cover 
only certain activities of brokers. 
Many simply prescribe criminal pen­
alties and make no provision for ad­
ministrative enforcement. 
The Effect ofthe Act 
Of importance to the practitioner is 
the way the Act is affected by the rele­
vant state law or local ordinance. Sec­
tion 3610(c) of the Act provides that 
whenever a state or local fair-housing 
law provides rights and remedies for 
alleged discriminatory housing prac­
tices that are "substantially equivalent" 
to the rights and remedies supplied by 
the Act, the United States Department 
of Housing and Urban Development 
("HUD") is to refer any complaint 
filed to the appropriate state or local 
agency. 42 U.S.C. §3610(c). If the state 
or local agency commences action on 
the complaint within 30 days, HUD is 
to take no further action. 
More importantly, under section 
3(i()l (d) of the Act the complainant can 
bring a civil action in federal court if 
HUD has been unable to obtain volun­
tary compliance within 30 days. 42 
U.S.C. §3610(d). If, however, the com­
plainant has a judicial remedy under a 
"substantially equivalent" state or local 
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law, he is precluded from proceeding 
in federal court and is relegated to the 
state or local remedies. 
Whether the state or local law is 
substantially equivalent to the Act is 
not always easily determined. Because 
it has been charged with making such 
a determination, HUD has developed 
a procedure for recognizing substan­
tially equivalent laws. The determina­
tion is based on two separate inqui­
ries: 
• Whether the state or local law on its 
face provides rights and remedies that 
are substantially equivalent; and 
• Whether the administration of the 
state or local law is such that, in fact, 
complainants are provided equivalent 
rights and remedies. 24 C.ER. § 115.2 
(1986). 
HUD publishes a list of those states 
and localities whose fair housing laws 
it has determined to be substantially 
equivalent. As of the latest revision, 
the laws of 39 states and 57 localities 
had been determined to be substan­
tially equivalent. 24 C.ER. §115.11 
(1986). 
Although HUD's determination 
concerning any particular state or lo­
cal law is not binding upon a court, it 
is entitled to great weight, especially 
when it has been consistently main­
tained over a long period of time. See 
Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. 
Co., 400 U.S. 205 (1972); North Ha­
ven Bd. ofEd. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512 
(1982). 
E NFORCEMENT • The Act created three methods for its enforce­
ment. The statute establishes an ad­
ministrative procedure to assist in the 
conciliation of housing discrimina­
tion complaints. 42 U.S.C. §3610. 
The Secretary of HUD is charged 
with handling these complaints, 
which must be in writing. 42 U.S.C. 
§3610(a). 
Under this statutory scheme HUD 
has 30 days to: 
• Conduct an initial investigation; 
• Decide if conciliation can settle the 
dispute; and 
• Notify the parties of its intent to re­
solve the complaint. Id. 
The statute provides that a com­
plainant may file a private lawsuit to 
enforce rights protected by this sec­
tion between the thirty-first and sixti­
eth day after the filing of the com­
plaint with HUD. 42 U.S.C. §3610(d). 
Failure to take this action will result in 
the loss of the right to file suit under 
section 3610(c) of the Aet. Waters v. 
Provident Nat'/ Bank, 521 E Supp. 
1025 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Tatum v. 
Myrick, 425 E Supp. 809 (M.D. Fla. 
1977). It is possible to extend the 180­
day statute-of-limitations period un­
der the Act. By filing the HUD com­
plaint on the one-hundred-eightieth 
day, section 3610 of the Act permits a 
party to file a federal lawsuit 240 days 
after the housing discrimination oc­
curred. 
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The Conciliation P~ 
The conciliation process is fairly in­
formal. Usually a HUD investigator 
will get the parties, who may or may 
not be represented by attorneys, to­
gether to discuss the nature of the 
complaint and the strength of the evi­
dence supporting it. Generally, no. 
witnesses are present besides the com­
plainant and the respondent. There is 
no testimony as such and the meeting 
is not recorded. 
The purpose is to try to reach a set­
tlement prior to the filing of a court 
action. Such a settlement can consist 
of an apology, a monetary settlement, 
or affirmative aetion (that is, agree­
ment by the respondent to have its 
staff undergo fair housing training, to 
market affirmatively, to pay for fu­
ture auditing, and the like), or all of 
the above. If HUD is unable to re­
solve the matter successfully, the com­
plainant may proceed to file a federal 
court action - assuming the statute­
of-limitations period has not been ex­
ceeded. 
Unlike Title Vil of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§2000e et 
seq., dealing with employment dis­
crimination, victims of housing bias 
may simply avoid the administrative 
process by filing a lawsuit under sec­
tion 3612 of the Act. The Supreme 
Court has held that section 3612 pro­
vides an independent remedy which 
may be pursued at the same time 
HUD is investigating a section 3610 
complaint. Gladstone Realtors v. Vil­
lage of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 109 
(1979). See42 U.S.C. § 3612(a), how­
ever, which requires a court to stay le­
gal action prior to any trial, if it ap­
pears that HUD's conciliation efforts 
are likely to be successful. This is con­
sistent with section 3610(f) requiring 
HUD to terminate all efforts to con­
ciliate a complaint when the matter 
comes to trial. 
The last method of enforcement is 
the institution of litigation by the At­
torney General of the United States. 
42 U.S.C. §3613. To file a lawsuit un­
der this provision, the Justice Depart­
ment must prove that a "pattern or 
practice" of housing discrimination is 
occurring that raises an issue of gen­
eral public importanee. United States 
v. Pelzer Realty Co., Inc., 484 E2d 
438, 444 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 
416 U.S. 936 (1974). The Attorney 
General need not, however, meet this 
requirement to enforce HUD-ap­
proved conciliation agreements. See 
United States v. Reece, 457 E Supp. 
43, 47 (D. Mont. 1981). 
One important consideration is 
that the 180-day statute-of-limitation 
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provision does not apply to the 
United States. United States v. Sum­
merlin, 310 U.S. 414 (1940); United 
States v. Mitchell, 580 F.2d 789 (5th 
Cir. 1978). Therefore, a crucial de­
fense concerning a limitation period is 
not available when the Government is 
bringing the action against the land­
lord or seller. 
P ROHIBITED PRACTICES. The stat­utes outlined above broadly pro­
hibit discrimination in housing. Some 
of the specific acts and practices pro­
hibited are enumerated in the statutes; 
others have been defined through liti­
gation. Since 1968, the year the Act 
was passed and Jones v. Mayer Co., 
392 U.S. 409 (1968), was decided, the 
courts have had ample opportunity to 
interpret many of the provisions of 
the federal laws prohibiting housing 
discrimination. 
The primary lesson for practition­
ers to be drawn from the case law 
since 1968 is that these statutes, espe­
cially Title VIII, are to be construed 
broadly. As stated by the Eighth Cir­
cuit Court of Appeals in a passage of­
ten quoted by other courts: 
"Recent cases make clear that the stat­
utes prohibit all forms of discrimi­
nation, sophisticated as well as sim­
ple-minded, and thus disparity of 
treatment between white and blacks, 
burdensome application procedures, 
and tactics of delay, hinderance, and 
special treatment must receive short 
shrift from the courts." Williams v. 
Mathews Co., 499 F.2d 819, 826 (8th 
Cir.1974) 
As is shown in the cases discussed 
in the following sections identifying 
specific prohibited practices, the 
courts have become adept at looking 
"beyond the form of a transaction to 
its substance" and finding and pro­
scribing "practices which actually or 
predictively result in racial discrimina­
tion, irrespective defendant's motiva­
tion." Id. 
Refusal To Sell or Rent 
The most obvious form of housing 
discrimination, and the first practice 
to be prohibited in Title VIII, is the 
refusal to sell or rent or to negotiate 
for a sale or rental on the basis of pro­
hibited criteria. Clearly, the apart­
ment manager who tells a black apart­
ment seeker that he cannot become a 
tenant because he is black violates the 
law. Such a fact situation is rare. 
More common is the situation in 
which the apartment seekers are not 
told the real reason and, at trial, the 
apartment manager offers "business 
reasons" that, for some reason, do 
not seem to disqualify whites. Harper 
v. Hutton, 594 F.2d 1091, 1092 (6th 
Cir. 1979) (which held that a refusal to 
rent to a black couple was due not to 
"business reasons" but to the fact that 
the couple was black and poor). Such 
a refusal to rent to a bona fide home­
seeker violates Title VIII and section 
1982. Note that section 3()()4(a) pro­
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vides a cause of action only for the 
refusal to sell or rent after the making 
of a bona fide offer. A tester, not be­
ing a bona fide homeseeker, has no 
cause ofaetion under that subsection. 
A refusal to rent to an interracial 
couple is also a violation of Title VIII 
and section 1982, even assuming the 
refusal to be based on a good-faith 
belief that interracial marriages lead 
to tension and thus to disturbances. 
Oliver v. Shelly, 538 F. Supp. fJOO (S.D. 
Tex. 1982). As long as raee is a faetor 
in the decision not to rent, there is a 
violation. 
Disguised Refusals 
A refusal to sell a home on the basis 
of race of the buyer, no matter how 
disguised, is also a violation. Thus, a 
builder who signs sham contracts and 
puts up "sold" signs in order not to 
have to renegotiate for the sale of 
homes to blacks, violates the law, as 
does a realtor who describes a list 
price for a condominium as firm to 
blacks but as negotiable to whites. 
United States v. Pelzer Realty Co., 
Inc., 484 F.2d 438 (5th Cir.1973); 
Hobson v. Humphreys, Inc., 563 F. 
Supp. 344 (W.D. Tenn. 1982). A dis­
criminatory refusal to allow the pur­
chase of a part of a co-operative 
building is similarly prohibited. Ro­
binson v. 12 Lofts Realty, Inc., 610 
F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1979). 
Discriminatory Impact 
A discriminatory refusal to sell will 
also be found when certain conditious 
are set for a sale and those conditions 
will necessarily have a discriminatory 
impact on minorities. For instance, 
there are two remarkably similar deci­
sions concerning the sale of lots with 
restrictions as to particular builders 
permitted to construct homes on 
those lots. Williams v. Matthews Co., 
499 F.2d 819 (8th Cir.1974); McHaney 
v. Spears, 526 F. Supp. 566 (W.D. 
Tenn. 1981). In both cases, the courts 
found that the policy discriminated 
against blacks. 
Of course, not every refusal to sell 
or rent to a minority will be found to 
be discriminatory. As long as the deci­
sion is not in any way racially moti­
vated, liability should not exist. KaJr 
Ian v. 442 Wellington Cooperative 
Corp., 567 F. Supp. 53 (N.D. lll. 
1983). 
To Otherwise Make 
Unavailable or Deny Rental or Sale 
Section 3604(a) of the Act not only 
prohibits an outright refusal to sell or 
rent, but also states that it is unlawful 
to "otherwise make unavailable or 
deny, a dwelling to any person" for a 
discriminatory reason. 42 U.S.C. 
§3604(a). This "catch-all" phrase 
seems to be as broad as Congress 
could have made it and, consequently, 
"all practices which have the effect of 
denying dwellings on prohibited 
grounds are therefore unlawful." 
United States v. Youritan Constr. Co., 
370 F. Supp. 643, 648 (N.D. Cal. 
1973), afj"d, 509 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 
1975). Thus not only is an outright re­
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fusal to sell or rent illegal, but any 
practice that may have that effect is 
also forbidden, such as: 
• The use ofmore burdensome appli­
cation procedures; 
• The use of delaying tactics; or 
• Supplying prospective black ten­
ants with incomplete information. Id. 
In short, housing suppliers should 
be aware that differential treatment 
of any housing seeker on prohibited 
grounds can result in liability. 
Other Prohibited Practices 
One of the practices that has been 
held to fall under this prohibition is 
the "grudging acceptance" of blacks 
as compared to· enthusiastic accept­
ance or solicitation of whites. United 
States v. Peker Realty Co., 484 E2d 
438 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. 
Treasure Lakes, Inc., 1 EOH §13,(i()() 
(W.D. Pa. 1973). 
Also prohibited by section 3(>()4(a) 
is the refusal to finance housing in ra­
cially integrated neighborhoods, a 
practice commonly referred to as 
"redlining." Lau/man v. Oakley Bldg. 
& Loan Co., 408 E Supp. 489 (S.D. 
Ohio); Harrison v. Otto G. Hein­
zeroth Co., 414 E Supp. 66 (N.D. 
Ohio 1976); 430 E Supp. 893 (N.D. 
Ohio 1977). In the latter case, the 
court held that white plaintiffs could 
assert such a claim and further found 
that the practice of requiring a much 
higher down payment for a home in 
an integrated area also violated sec­
tions 3604(c) and 3617 of the Act. 
Redlining also violates section 3()()5. 
Whether insurance redlining also 
violates the "otherwise makes unavail­
able" provision is an open question. 
Compare Dunn v. Midwestern In­
dem., 472 E Supp. 1106 (S.D. Ohio 
1979); Mackey v. Nationwide Ins. 
Cos., 724 E2d 419 (4th Cir. 1984). It 
should be noted that in Mackey, the 
court, while holding that insurance 
redlining was not covered under the 
Act and that the plaintiff, a black in­
surance agent, did not have standing 
to raise a claim under sections 1981 
and 1982, did state that the home­
owners involved, as the direct victims 
of the alleged discrimination, may 
have a cause of action under sections 
1981 and 1982. In the same vein, it 
has been held that Act section 3604(a) 
does cover racially discriminatory 
home appraisals. United States v. 
Am. InSt. of Real Estate Appraisers, 
442 E Supp. 1072 (N.D. m. 1977), a[r 
peal dismissed, 590 E2d 242 (7th 
Cir.1978). 
Some other practices that have 
been held to come under this particu­
lar prohibition are: 
• The lockout of black tenants on the 
basis of race; 
• The interference with black neigh­
bors' access to their property; and 
• Racially motivated attempts to in­
timidate and interfere with the devel­
opment of low-income housing 
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through allegedly groundless objec­
tions at administrative hearings and 
appeals. Shaw v. Cassar, 558 F. Supp. 
303 (E.D. Mich. 1983); Evans v. 
'Jilbbe, 651E2cl661 (5th Cir.1981) (a 
white neighbor erected a gate denying 
access to the only road leading to the 
property of black neighbors and gave 
the keys to the whites but not to the 
blacks); Bendetson v. Payson, 534 E 
Supp. 539 (D. Mass. 1982). 
Attorneys' Advice 
In light of the broad reach of the 
statute, attorneys advising realtors or 
landlords should counsel them to 
avoid any behavior that is or could be 
considered discriminatory. In fact, 
positive steps can be taken ahead of 
time both to insure against acts of dis­
crimination and to minimize the po­
tential damages should these acts oc­
cur. 
First, all realtors and landlords 
should develop standardized methods 
. of selecting and treating tenants and 
prospective purchasers. Employees 
should be instructed and trained to 
apply those methods to all persons, 
regardless of race or sex. Realtors and 
owners of large rental properties may 
want to consider having staff undergo 
training by fair housing agencies. 
That training would not only help to 
educate employers, but would also 
identify any practices that could have 
a discriminatory impact. Further­
more, evidence of participation in 
that training could reduce the likeli­
hood or amount of an award of puni­
tive damages should discrimination 
occur and be proven in a lawsuit. Mc­
Donald v. Verble, 622 F.2cl 1227 (6th 
Cir. 1980). 
In the same manner, an affirmative 
marketing agreement entered into 
with HUD or a local municipality, or 
both, may be helpful in avoiding liti­
gation. At the very least the fair hous­
ing logo showing that the renter or 
broker provides housing to all per­
sons on an equal basis should be 
prominently displayed at rental and 
sales offices. 
Racial Steering 
Another practice that has been held 
to make housing unavailable and, 
therefore, unlawful, is "racial steer­
ing," defined by the Supreme Court as: 
"A practice by whieh real estate bro­
kers and agents preserve and encour­
age patterns of racial segregation in 
available housing by steering mem­
bers of racial and ethnic groups to 
buildings occupied primarily by mem­
bers of such racial and ethnic groups 
and away from buildings and neigh­
borhoods inhabited primarily by 
members of other races or groups." 
Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 
U.S. 363, 366 n.1. (1982). 
Any word, phrase, or action of a 
realtor that may have the effect of 
steering or ehannelling a prospective 
buyer into a particular area, regard­
less of whether the attempt is success­
ful, is unlawful. Zuch v. Hussey, 394 
F. Supp. 1028 (E.D. Mich. 1975), 
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aff'd and remanded, 547 F.2d 1168 
(6th Cir. 1975). Steering tenants to 
particular apartments is similarly un­
lawful. United States v. Mitchell, 580 
F.2d 789 (5th Cir. 1978); United States 
v. Henshaw Brothers, Inc., 401 F. 
Supp. 399 (E.D. Va. 1974). Proof of 
steering alone is sufficient to sustain a 
finding of discrimination. Moore v. 
Townsend, 525 F.2d 482 (7th Cir. 
1975). 
The kind of practices that may 
result in a finding of unlawful steering 
include: 
• Selective listing and viewing of 
properties; 
• Misleading statements; 
• Limited and selective advertising; 
• Discriminatory treatment or as­
signment of black sales agents; and 
• Discriminatory treatment of bro­
kers who regularly deal with black cli­
ents. See Fair Housing Council of 
Bergen County, Inc. v. Eastern Bergen 
County Multiple Listing Serv., Inc., 
422 F. Supp. 1071 (D. N.J. 1976); 
United States v. Real Estate One, Inc., 
433 F. Supp. 1140 (E.D. Mich. 1977). 
In addition to direct proof of dis­
criminatory treatment of actual 
homeseckers or testers, census data 
can also be of use in determining 
whether steering has taken place. 
There is a wide range of data sources 
for population and housing charac­
teristics easily available from the 
United States Departments of Labor 
and Commerce. See, e.g., U.S. Bu­
reau of Labor Statistics, Department 
of Labor, Bulletin No. 1879, Direc­
tory of Data Sources of Racial and 
Ethnic Minorities (1975). The United 
States Department of Commerce has 
established the Standard Metropoli­
tan Statistical Areas (SMSA), which 
are economic areas to be used for the 
comparison of census data. 
Discrimination in 
Tenns and Conditions 
Section 3604(b) proscribes discrim­
ination in the terms, conditions, or 
privileges of sale or rental or in the 
provision of services or facilities in 
connection with housing. Covered by 
this provision and by section 1982 are 
practices such as charging blacks 
higher prices for property or services 
than would be charged to whites, or 
even requiring blacks but not whites 
to pay closing costs. Clark v. Univer­
sal Builders, Inc., 501 F.2d 324 (7th 
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1070 
(1974); Hobson v. Humphreys, Inc., 
563 F. Supp. 344 (W.D. Teun. 1982); 
United States v. Pelzer Realty Co., 484 
F.2d 438 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 
416 U.S. 939 (1974). Also prohibited 
is unequal maintenance and upkeep 
for black residents. Hawkins v. 'Jbwn 
of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 
1971), reversed and remanded, 461 
F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1972) (liability un­
der the fourteenth amendment). 
Advertising 
It is unlawful to make, print, or 
publish any discriminatory notice, 
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statement, or advertisement with re­
spect to the sale or rental of a prop­
erty. 42 U.S.C. §3604(c). The provi­
sion has been upheld against first 
amendment challenge and applied to 
media carrying such advertisements 
as well as the persons who place them. 
United States v. Hunter, 459 R2d 205 
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934 
(1972). Implicitly, as well as explicity, 
discriminatory advertisements are 
prohibited. Id. 
Instructions to employees to dis­
criminate are also covered by this sec­
tion, as are the recording and distribu­
tion of racially restrictive covenants. 
United States v. Reddoch, 1 EOH 
,13,569 (S.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd, 467 
R2d 897 (5th Cir. 1972); Mayers v. 
Ridley, 465 R2d 630 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
Selective advertising on the basis of 
race is also prohibited by this section 
as well as by Act section 3604(a), since 
that practice has the effect of steering. 
United States v. Real&late One, Inc., 
433 R Supp. 1140 (E.D. Mich. 1977). 
Misrepresentations 
Regarding Availability 
Under Act section 3604(d) it is un­
lawful to represent for a discrimina­
tory reason that a property is unavail­
able for sale or rental if it is available. 
Prohibited are simple false statements 
to blacks that property is unavailable 
as well as more subtle methods of 
misinformation, such as placing 
"sold" signs in front of houses that 
have not actually been sold for the 
purposes of not having to deal with 
blacks. United States v. Reddoch, 1 
EOH ,13,569 (S.D. Ala. 1972), afj'd, 
467 R2d 897 (5th Cir. 1972); United 
States v. Pelzer Realty, 484 R2d 438 
(5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 
936 (1974). 
Block Busting 
Another practice that is specifically 
prohibited is "block busting." Section 
3604(e) of the Act states that it is un­
lawful: 
"For profit, to induce or attempt to 
induce any person to sell or rent any 
dwelling by representations regarding 
the entry or prospective entry into the 
neighborhood of a person or persons 
of a particular race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin." 
The purpose of this section is to pre­
vent realtors from "preying upon the 
fears of property owners in racially 
transitional areas" to induce panic 
selling. Zuch v. Hussey, 394 R Supp. 
at 1049. The statute has been upheld 
against first amendment challenge 
since it prohibits conduct, not speech. 
United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, 
Inc., 474 R2d 115 (5th Cir. 1971). 
Analydng Block Busting 
To determine whether particular 
solicitations would constitute a "block 
busting" violation, the section can be 
broken down to its elements: 
• Whether the solicitations are made 
for profit; 
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• Whether the solicitations were in­
tended to induce the sale of property; 
and 
• Whether the solicitations would 
convey to a reasonable man, under 
the circumstances, that members of a 
particular race are moving into the 
neighborhood. Zuch v. Hussey, 394 F. 
Supp. at 1049. 
The "for-profit" requirement does 
not mean that the solicitor intended to 
buy the property and sell it at a higher 
price. Instead, the term has its ordi­
nary meaning and covers the normal 
activity of a real estate broker. United 
States v. Mintzes, 304 F. Supp. 1305 
(D. Md. 1969); Sanborn v. Wagner, 
354 F. Supp. 291 (D. Md. 1973). 
The second element of the subsee­
tion, the intent to induce a sale, is a 
question of fact in each particular 
case. Whether a representation made 
in response to a question of a home­
owner can be held unlawful will prob­
ably depend on the circumstances and 
the content of the answer. United 
States v. Saroff, 377 F. Supp. 352 
(E.D. Tenn. 1974), aff'd, 516 F.2d 902 
(6th Cir. 1975); But see Zuch v. Hus­
sey, 394 F. Supp. aH051. 
The third element is governed by a 
"reasonable man" test. Because repre­
sentations may be either obvious or 
subtle, the problem is to determine 
whether the representation made 
"would convey to a reasonable person 
in the solicited area that blacks were 
seeking to move into the neighbor­
hood." Heights Community Congress 
v. Hilltop Realty, Inc., 774 F.2d 135, 
142(6thCir. 1985), cert. denied, 106S. 
Ct. 1206 (1986). This determination 
may require a careful inquiry into the 
conditions and atmosphere in the par­
ticular neighborhood solicited. See 
United States v. Mitchell, 327 F. Supp. 
476 (N.D. Ga. 1971), in which the 
court indicates the types of questions 
that should be asked. 
(To be continued) 
The first black family entering an all-white neighborhood tends to pay 
more for the housing than would be paid by white families purchasing 
the identical house. Then because of the fears generated, the percep­
tion of white residents in the area causes a great many white people to 
put up a great many houses for sale within a very short period of time. 
This flooding of the market tends to have a negative effect on the price 
stablization of the housing in that area. 
You may also aehieve social and psychological stability when a 
neighborhood becomes black because what you have done is re­
segregated the neighborhood and the process of change, of transition, 
is already in tile past. 
Zuch v. Hussey, 394 F. Supp. 1028, 1032 (1975), modif. on 
other grds, 547 F.2d 1186 (6th Cir. 1977) 
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